We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. Projects may differ in their value for the designer, and their cost is private information. In this allocation problem, the quantity of procured projects is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces 8 ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify set-10 tings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an implementation with a descending-clock auction. 
Introduction
The existence of a corresponding (direct) DA auction implies that the allocation rule can be implemented with an appropriately designed descending-clock auction 14 as its corresponding indirect form: Every project faces a clock with a continuously descending price on it, and indicates whether it is willing to conduct its project 16 at this price. Prices do not ascend again. In this auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for any project to exit the auction once the clock price hits the project's 18 actual cost level. We show that it is optimal to rank projects according to their cost and "greenlight" the cheapest ones, when projects have identical values and 20 costs are drawn from the same distribution. That is, price clocks run down synchronously and hence projects exit in order of their costs until the budget 22 suffices to pay the current clock price to all remaining active projects.
For the case in which costs are drawn from different distributions and/or project 24 values differ, we restrict attention to the two-project case to retain tractability. In applications, the designer may prefer some projects over others and might 26 have different information over cost distributions. In standard procurement settings, the quantity of units to be procured is not endogenously determined by 28 a budget-constrained mechanism as in our model, but it is exogenously fixed to be some quantity k. It is well known that in k-unit procurement auctions the k 30 projects with the greatest nonnegative virtual surpluses are implemented, e.g., Luton and McAfee (1986) . In the asymmetric case, the ranking implied by costs 32 and the ranking implied by virtual surpluses do not necessarily coincide. Broadly speaking, the designer discriminates against stochastically stronger projects, and 34 prefers projects with higher values. The asymmetry requires that each project faces an individual clock and prices decrease asynchronously. In settings with 36 exogenously given quantity restrictions, the clocks' speed can be optimally adjusted such that the virtual surplus of marginal projects is kept equal at all times, 38 see Caillaud and Robert (2005, Proposition 1) .
4
Interestingly, the optimality of such an allocation rule does not simply translate into the asymmetric case of our environment. In contrast, projects are not always 2 greenlighted in order of their virtual surpluses. Therefore we cannot adopt the approach of Caillaud and Robert (2005) . Instead, the descending-clock imple-4 mentation of the optimal allocation includes individual clocks stopping at certain times. Here, a "quantity-quality tradeoff" kicks in: We show that the optimal 6 allocation generically features instances in which out of two rival projects the project with lower virtual surplus is chosen. The reasoning behind this result 8 is that the number of procured units is endogenous. In the asymmetric case, always greenlighting in order of virtual surplus reduces the expected number 10 of greenlighted projects compared to the optimal mechanism. Strategyproofness creates a tradeoff between quantity (have a higher probability to implement more 12 projects) and quality (guarantee to implement the superior project) of the procured projects. This discrimination of the stronger project is employed on top 14 of the discrimination due to stochastic domination through the virtual costs.
Clock auctions are generally easy to understand and hard to manipulate. thermore, they are less information hungry than, for example, sealed bid auctions. In descending-clock auctions, the designer only learns the private infor-18 mation of those projects that are not greenlighted. In fact, Milgrom and Segal (2015) show that clock auctions are the only strategyproof mechanisms that pre-20 serve winners' unconditional privacy: Winners only need to reveal the minimum of their private information that is necessary to prove that they should be win-
22
ning. These features of clock auctions make them attractive for applications in which there is limited trust between the involved parties.
24
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that considers purely expost constrained optimal procurement design. Such a restrictive setting can be 26 seen as a "worst-case scenario" for the designer, suiting many economic applications. In our leading example of the development fund, an ex-post budget 28 constraint appears natural as budgets are usually fixed. The nonprofit nature of the projects might prohibit acquiring additional money on the financial market.
30
Information rents are necessary, because a project might want to spend money on extra equipment that is convenient for the project's staff but has no value for the 32 designer. In practice, such incentive problems are often resolved using dominantstrategy implementable mechanisms. In strategyproof mechanisms, agents have 34 no incentive to invest in espionage activities or to hire consultants to avoid misspecification of beliefs. Mainly, dominant strategies are desirable as they are 36 easy to explain and not prone to manipulation. For similar reasons, we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. Deterministic mechanisms obviate the 38 need for a credible randomization device and are therefore more easily applica-ble in practice. As our agents care about their ex-post payoff, each constraint in a stochastic mechanism would have to hold for all outcomes of the mechanism's 2 randomization anyway. Finally, ex-post participation constraints are necessary because projects simply cannot be conducted with insufficient funds, and the 4 designer wants to avoid costly renegotiations when the projects default.
Literature 6
Even though the knapsack problem has a wide range of economic applications, there are relatively few publications in economics on this issue. Most promi-8 nently, Maskin (2002) , in his Nancy L. Schwartz memorial lecture, addressed the related problem of the UK government that put aside a fixed fund to encourage 10 firms to reduce their pollution. The government faces n firms that have private marginal cost of abatement θ i and can commit to reduce x i units of pollution. To 12 reduce pollution as much as possible, the government pays expected compensation transfers t i to the firms, who report costs and proposed abatement to maxi-14 mize t i − θ i x i . For some distributions, Maskin (2002) proposes a mechanism that satisfies an ex-post participation constraint, an ex-post incentive compatibility 16 constraint, and the condition that the budget is not exceeded in expectation. In response to Maskin (2002) , Chung and Ely (2002b) look at a more general class
18
of mechanism design problems with budget constraints and translate them into a settingà la Baron and Myerson (1982) . Their approach nests Maskin (2002) 20 and also Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) as special cases. However, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) more explicitly derive a constructive solution. In contrast to us, 22 they all consider a soft budget constraint that only requires the sum of expected transfers to be less than the budget. By incorporating the budget constraint 24 into a Lagrangian function and ignoring the monotonicity (incentive) constraint, they find a mechanism that, under the standard regularity condition, indeed is 26 incentive compatible.
In addition, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) use AGV-budget-balancing (such as 28 Börgers and Norman, 2009 ) to obtain a mechanism which is ex-post budgetfeasible. However, transformation into a mechanism with an ex-post balanced 30 budget in such a way comes at the cost of sacrificing ex-post individual rationality. Many applications do not allow this constraint to be weakened. For 32 instance, subsidy applicants usually cannot be forced to conduct their proposal when receiving only a small or possibly no subsidy. Alternatively, limited lia-34 bility justifies insisting on ex-post individual rationality. Because we want both constraints to hold ex-post, we cannot build on their techniques and, thus, we 36 approach the problem by characterizing the optimal allocation rule.
6
To the best of our knowledge, no paper exists that jointly considers optimal mechanism design under ex-post budget balance and ex-post individual rational-2 ity in a procurement setting. Ensthaler and Giebe (2014b) propose a belief-free clock mechanism that coincides with our optimal mechanism in the symmetric 4 case for many parameterizations 4 but differs in the asymmetric case by holding the cost-benefit-ratio equal among projects. However, it has to be stressed 6 that our mechanism designer knows the priors and projects' values, and exploits this knowledge, i.e., our mechanism is not detail-free. By simulating different 8 settings, they conclude that this mechanism outperforms a mechanism used in practice. In contrast to their setting, the mechanism designer in our model values 10 residual money. In Section 4, we discuss lesser weights on residual money and find that our main results qualitatively translates to the case in which residual 12 money is neglected.
Because of the appeal of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) mech-14 anisms compared to Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms, many researchers have produced valuable BIC-DIC equivalence results. These results
16
characterize environments in which restricting attention to the more robust incentive criterion comes without loss. Our setup is not contained in these environ-18 ments. For any BIC mechanism, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show that one can construct a DIC mechanism implementing the same ex-post allocation 20 rule, whenever this allocation rule is monotone in each coordinate. However, the ex-post transfers of the constructed DIC mechanism are not guaranteed to satisfy utilities introduced by Manelli and Vincent (2010) . For any BIC mechanism, including the optimal one, they construct a DIC mechanism that yields the same 26 interim expected utilities. Here, the ex-post allocation as well as the ex-post transfers might differ between the two. Therefore a DIC mechanism equivalent 28 to a feasible BIC mechanism might violate the ex-post constraints in our setting.
Budget-constrained procurement setups have received much attention in the com-30 puter science literature. Instead of specifying the optimal mechanism, the authors in this literature typically aim to construct allocation algorithms that give 32 good approximation guarantees. In other words, they try to maximize the minimal payoff an algorithm can guarantee compared to the full-information knap-34 sack solver's payoff. Apart from the seminal paper by Singer (2010) , the works of Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer (2011) and Lu (2011) 36 are notable examples of this approach. Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2014) present a stochastic algorithm and show that it gives the best possible approximation 38 4 For all parameter constellations such that virtual surplus is always nonnegative. 7 guarantee in the many-projects limit in which any individual project's costs are small compared to the budget. While the above papers examine the belief-free 2 case, Bei, Chen, Gravin, and Lu (2012) propose an algorithm for setups in which the designer knows how the private information is distributed.
4
Other auction theoretic papers featuring "knapsack auctions" deal with a slightly different problem compared to us. Aggarwal and Hartline (2006) consider a set-6 ting in which each agent is characterized by his object of commonly known size and a privately known valuation for having his object placed in the auctioneer's 8 knapsack with commonly known capacity. They are looking for the truthful auction that best approximates the optimal full-information monotone pricing 10 rule which maximizes the auctioneer's profit. Mu'Alem and Nisan (2008) cover the case of an auctioneer maximizing social welfare instead. Dütting, Gkatzelis, 12 and Roughgarden (2014) study the performance of DA auctions for knapsack auctions, i.e., they show DA auctions fail to achieve a constant factor approx-14 imation of the optimal social welfare in knapsack auctions. Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu (2011) investigate a similar knapsack problem of a profit maxi-16 mizing auctioneer in a dynamic setting: Agents sequentially arrive over time and are either included in the knapsack immediately or lost forever. Thereby they 18 avoid combinatorial issues, which gives rise to a threshold property of the optimal mechanism. In such knapsack auctions, the mechanism designer maximizes 20 the sum of transfers, and the value only enters the individual projects' payoff while the capacity constraint is imposed on the weight assigned to agents. In our 22 framework, the value is collected by the auctioneer and the capacity constraint is imposed on the sum of transfers. Because of the latter, knapsack auctions and 24 our knapsack procurement auctions are not dual problems.
There seems to be no reasonable analogy for our setting to another setting in 26 which the mechanism designer is a similarly constrained seller and the agents are buyers. The literature on group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, initiated 28 by Moulin (1999) , considers the dual of a "surplus-sharing" problem. The crucial difference between this problem and our "budget-sharing" problem is that the 30 agents themselves produce the output to be distributed, while in our case the budget to be distributed is fixed and unrelated to the surplus created by the 32 agents, which is collected by the mechanism designer. Budget-constrained buyers in auctions have been discussed in the literature, e.g., by Che and Gale (1998) Pai and Vohra (2014) . However, these authors study budget-constrained agents whereas in our setting the designer is budget-constrained.
36
In the following section, we introduce the model. We start the analysis in Section 3 that is divided into a preliminary analysis for the general case, a full charac-38 terization of the general two-project case and the symmetric case, and finally 8 a discussion of the general asymmetric case. Next, we discuss extensions and possible modifications to the model in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 2 5.
Model

4
We consider a set of n projects I = {1, . . . , n} and one mechanism designer. The designer gains utility v i if and only if project i ∈ I is conducted. Each project 6 can be conducted exactly once and its value is independent of the allocation.
5
We consider projects to be utility maximizing agents. If project i is executed, it To compensate project i for its cost, the designer pays transfer t i . We employ a 16 revelation-principle argument and without loss of generality only consider direct mechanisms.
6 A direct mechanism is characterized by q i , t i . It maps a vector
18
of cost reports c ∈ C into binary provisions decision and transfers. We denote an allocation rule by γ : C → P(I). It maps a cost vector into the set of "green-
20
lighted" projects, an element of the power set of I. Correspondingly, we call I \ γ(c) the set of "redlighted" projects, the projects that are not implemented.
22
We restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. This restriction implies that 5 That is, there are no exogenously given complementarities in a sense that one project's value increases when it is conducted together with another one or that the implementation of one project renders the other one worthless.
6 In general, the revelation principle does not hold when restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms: Deterministic direct mechanisms are unable to replicate mixed-strategy equilibria in deterministic indirect mechanisms, as noted by, e.g., Strausz (2003) . However, in our setting we do not lose generality. A mixed-strategy equilibrium consists of a distribution over purestrategy profiles. Because the mechanism is implementable in dominant strategies any of these pure-strategy profiles also constitutes a pure-strategy equilibrium, in particular the purestrategy equilibrium associated with the designer's most preferred outcome. Similarly, because the mechanism is ex-post constrained, this outcome is feasible. Therefore, while there are allocations that (in the class of deterministic mechanisms) can only be implemented by indirect mechanisms, the designer's most preferred feasible allocation can truthfully be implemented in a direct mechanism.
once all cost reports are collected, we know with certainty which project is selected by the mechanism. In other words, the decision of implementation q i is binary,
where I denotes an indicator function that equal one if the corresponding condition is true and zero otherwise.
2
Given a mechanism and a cost realization c, project i's utility from reporting cost c ′ i is given by its transfer minus the cost it bears,
The designer derives value v i from each greenlighted project i while having to pay the sum of transfers. Therefore she wants to maximize the aggregate value of greenlighted projects net of transfers paid. Her (ex-post) utility function u D implies that the designer values residual money,
We impose an ex-post participation constraint. That is, if i is greenlighted the transfer must be at least as high as its cost,
In addition, the designer has a budget constraint which is "hard" in the sense that she cannot spend more than her budget B for any realization of the cost vector. That is, the designer can never exceed her budget,
Finally, incentive compatibility has to hold ex-post. Alternatively, we can say that the mechanism has to be implementable in (weakly) dominant strategies 7 or that the mechanism must be strategyproof. Therefore for every realization of the cost vector, project i's truthful report must yield at least as much utility as any possible deviation,
Analysis
We search for the direct mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the 2 designer and refer to this mechanism as the optimal mechanism. One may think that a natural approach to this problem would be to express the ex-post transfer
) as a function of the ex-post allocation decision q i (c i , c −i ), taking c −i as given, and applying the envelope theorem. In that case, it would be possible to 6 restrict attention to the allocation in order to solve for the optimal mechanism. However, this approach does not reduce the complexity of the problem. The allocation may be ill-behaved. Therefore we cannot straightforwardly arrive at sufficient conditions using convex optimization.
Instead, we aim at deriving a set of properties that every mechanism must inherit to be optimal. We start by rewriting the general problem. For the case n = 2, 16 we establish such properties by showing that the expected payoff yielded by any feasible mechanism not having one of the properties can be increased by 18 adopting the properties. By virtue of these properties, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a myopic clock auction as defined by Milgrom and Segal 20 (2015) . These properties extend to the symmetric case. However, we provide asymmetric examples with n > 2 that violate the properties in the optimal 22 mechanism, but are still implementable with a clock auction.
General preliminary analysis 24
Our first step is to show that strategyproofness implies that the optimal mechanism has to be a cutoff mechanism.
26
Lemma 1. The optimal mechanism can be represented by cutoff functions z i : C −i → C i such that project i is greenlighted if and only if it reports a cost weakly less than its cutoff,
The transfer to project i equals its cutoff if it is greenlighted and zero otherwise,
Proof. For any two cost reports c i , c ′ i ∈ C i of project i and for some c −i ∈ C −i , (IC) implies that if the allocation of i is the same, q i (c i ,
Otherwise, project i could, as one of the cost types, profitably deviate to the report yielding the higher transfer.
4
Conditional on i's allocation status and given any cost reports c −i , the transfer is fixed and does not vary with i's cost report. Hence, given c −i , there can only 6 be two different transfers t i for project i, one for each allocation status, t
Suppose to the contrary that for some realization c i < z i (c −i ) and some other
Then, type c i can profitably deviate to reporting c i to ensure the green light which yields a utility increase of
The last step is to show that t
This result follows from the mecha-14 nism being optimal, i.e., maximizing expected utility of the designer.
As a direct consequence of dominant-strategy implementability, Lemma 1 shows that allocation and transfers are characterized by cutoffs. Project i is greenlighted whenever it reports a cost that lies weakly below the cutoff. Crucially, these cutoffs are functions of the other cost reports c −i . However, the optimal cutoffs remain to be determined. The maximization problem of the designer is given by
(2)
Incentive compatibility and participation constraints hold by construction, as q i and t i are determined by cutoff functions. Even the particularly crazy candidate 2 in Figure 1 (introduced later) is incentive compatible and individually rational.
The next step towards solving this problem involves applying standard methods introduced by Myerson (1981) . Let the conditional expected probability of being greenlighted and the conditional expected transfer be
The interim incentive compatibility required by Myerson (1981) is weaker than 4 our condition (IC). Consequently, the expected transfer is determined by the allocation,
The usual monotonicity condition is 6 trivially fulfilled as we are dealing with cutoff mechanisms. This reformulation in turn allows us to rewrite the objective function as a function of the alloca-8 tion. Substituting into problem (2) and integrating by parts yields the following maximization problem,
We call ϕ i (c i ) := c i +
Here, ϕ and ψ are the procurement analogues to standard 12 auction terminology. We can directly see from problem (3) that the optimal mechanism maximizes the expected sum of greenlighted virtual surpluses.
14 Note that constrained optimization by Lagrangian is not straightforward here because of the nondifferentiability of the indicator function. Instead, in the 16 following we derive useful properties of the optimal cutoffs that can be exploited to characterize the optimal mechanism. A cutoff mechanism is by construction Definition 1. An allocation rule γ is monotonic in costs if i ∈ γ(c i , c −i ) and c
In words, if a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector, it also gets greenlighted when, all else equal, its cost is lower. To proceed, we restrict the class of 4 distributions from which costs can be drawn.
Assumption 1 (Log-concavity). For all i, the cumulative distribution function
This assumption is standard in information economics. It is equivalent to the 8 reverse hazard rate function f /F being a weakly decreasing function or the ratio F/f being weakly increasing. Hence, the standard regularity condition is implied: ϕ i is strictly increasing and ψ i is strictly decreasing. A decreasing reverse hazard rate is the procurement analogue to the assumption of increasing hazard rate 12 functions with a selling auctioneer.
Regularity ensures that a lower cost c i translates to a higher virtual surplus ψ i (c i ). Hence, we can define the following cutoff cost type
where regularity implies the invertibility of ψ i and thus allows for the above 14 definition of z * * i . In the symmetric case, z * * i = z * * for all i ∈ I. Let ζ * * be the n-dimensional vector with z * * i as i-th element for all i ∈ I.
16
Definition 2. An allocation rule γ is ζ * * -exclusive if, for all i ∈ I, c i > z virtual surplus decreases the designer's payoff and uses part of the budget. Guaranteeing the green light for high-cost types comes at the cost of having to pay 2 higher information rents to all cost types. For the same reason, also a budgetunconstrained designer would implement a ζ * * -exclusive mechanism, even when 4 the surplus v i − c i is positive for all projects.
To continue our analysis, we focus on the more tractable two-project case in the 6 next subsection. The first aim is to provide more structure on the cutoff functions that determine the optimal allocation. This enables us to fully characterize the 8 optimal allocation and how to implement it.
3.2 n = 2
10
Reducing the set of mechanisms that are candidates for optimality implies a strong property in the two-project case: Project substitutability means that, if 12 a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector c, it is also greenlighted when, all else equal, another project's cost is increased. This property relates to the 14 cross-monotonicity defined in the cost-sharing problem of Moulin and Shenker (2001) : An agent's cost share cannot increase when the allocation set expands.
16
Definition 3. An allocation rule γ has substitutes if i ∈ γ(c) and c ′ j > c j for some j = i implies i ∈ γ(c ′ j , c −j ). Otherwise, the allocation rule has complements.
18
Having in mind a setting with an exogenously determined amount of projects to be procured and without a budget constraint, this property is clearly optimal, 20 because if i is among the projects with the highest virtual surpluses for some cost vector, it is also among them when the cost of some other project j is increased, i.e., when j's virtual surplus is decreased. However, with the budget constraint, this property does not hold in a full-information setting.
10 A cutoff mechanism 24 has substitutes if all functions z i are weakly increasing in each argument.
The optimality of this property will be proved jointly with Lemma 3 and Lemma For example, there are two projects, v 1 > v 2 . Under full information, both projects get implemented for a cost vector (c 1 , c 2 ) = (B − z, z). Then, increasing c 1 would kick project 2 out of the allocation. In contrast, in our asymmetric-information setting where c 2 pins down a cutoff z 1 (c 2 ) for project 1, project 1 instead loses the green light status, when its cost increases while c 2 remains constant.
case project j is implemented. If project i exceeds its cutoff, this frees budget to be distributed to project j. Consequently, j's transfer should either remain 2 constant or increase. For n > 2, a cost report does not simultaneously pin down all other cutoffs and the remaining budget. In asymmetric cases, it is possible 4 that projects endogenously become complements, see Subsection 3.4.
Project substitutability is related to the next property, non-bossiness. However, 6 the two properties are not equivalent since an allocation rule can have nonbossy complements as seen in Example 2. Milgrom and Segal (2015) provide an 8 example with substitutes and a bossy winner.
An allocation rule γ has non-bossy winners if for any i ∈ I, c ∈ C, and c
Otherwise, winners can be bossy. An allocation rule γ has non-bossy losers if for any i ∈ I, c ∈ C, and c
Otherwise, losers can be bossy. An allocation has non-bossy substitutes if it has substitutes and is non-bossy. An 16 allocation has non-bossy complements if it has complements and is non-bossy.
In words, a non-bossy winner (loser) cannot affect the allocation without chang-18 ing its own green-light (red-light) status. In Example 3, we illustrate that an optimal allocation rule can have bossy losers when there are at least three projects.
20
The following lemma states that, given both projects are greenlighted for two different cost vectors, the transfers for both cost vectors have to be the same.
22
That is, when both projects are greenlighted, their transfer is constant. Intuitively, optimal cutoffs cannot depend on greenlighted projects' cost, because for 24 these projects the cutoff coincides with the transfer. If the budget constraint is binding, a greenlighted project would be able to influence its own cutoff, i.e., the 26 budget minus the transfer to the other (greenlighted) project. This contradicts the notion of a cutoff mechanism.
28
Lemma 3. Suppose the nontrivial case with n = 2. If γ is optimal and γ( c 1 , c 2 ) = γ( c 1 , c 2 ) = {1, 2}, the transfers to both projects are constant. That is, {z 1 , z 2 } violating the lemma and define
i.e., a i is the highest cost of project i such that both projects are implemented.
Since by assumption there exist cost vectors such that both projects are green-2 lighted, the sets over which we have defined a 1 and a 2 are non-empty. The maximum exists by left-continuity of any optimal function z i . Figure 1: The depicted feasible mechanism greenlights both project for all cost combinations in the darker gray area. This mechanism cannot be optimal, since the alternative mechanism constructed is feasible as well, additionally greenlights a project in the lighter gray area and is otherwise equivalent.
Hence by definition of a 1 , there (not necessarily uniquely) existsċ 2 such that a 1 = z 1 (ċ 2 ). Similarly, there existsċ 1 such that a 2 = z 2 (ċ 1 ). By definition, (ċ 1 ,ċ 2 ) ≤ 8 (a 1 , a 2 ) and at cost realization (ċ 1 ,ċ 2 ) both projects are implemented. The budget feasibility of the candidate mechanism implies a 1 + a 2 ≤ B such that the 10 following constructed alternative mechanism is feasible as well.
The initial candidate cannot be optimal, since it is outperformed by an alterna-
We can replace any function z i with a left-continuous function that is identical up to a set of points with Lebesgue-measure zero. Hence, if there exists an optimal function z i that is not left-continuous, then there also exists a left-continuous version of the same function that yields the same payoff and hence is also optimal. tive mechanism with cutoffs
This alternative mechanism weakly outperforms the initial candidate state-by-2 state as it either implements the same allocation or a strictly better one by greenlighting an additional project. If a 1 + a 2 = B and both a i < z * * i , then the 4 alternative mechanism can be improved further by increasing cutoffs such that the budget constraint binds.
6
In Lemma 5, a form of the previous lemma is generalized to n > 2 if γ has substitutes: Given two cost vectors implement the same allocation and only 8 differ in the cost levels of greenlighted projects, the transfers to these greenlighted projects are identical for both cost vectors.
Lemma 4. Suppose n = 2. The optimal mechanism has substitutes,
and is non-bossy.
Proof. In Lemma 3, we have shown that an optimal z i is constant for all c j ≤ a j ,
12
as defined in (5). Consequently, the set of cost combinations such that both projects are implemented is i , B} for both i ∈ {1, 2}}. As a result, it is feasible and optimal to greenlight exactly one project for cost vectors (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ A ∪ Z * * . If it is optimal and feasible to implement project 1 given some cost vector (z 1 ( c 2 ), c 2 ), then, by regularity, the mechanism designer also prefers to greenlight project 1 when the cost of project 2 is increased to c 2 > c 2 with
i.e., decreasing cutoffs are suboptimal, z 1 ( c 2 ) ≥ z 1 ( c 2 ). Since cutoff functions
18
are weakly increasing, a project 2 cannot kick project 1 out of the allocation by reporting a higher cost. If project 2 reports a lower cost, it either does not change 20 the allocation (if c 2 ≤ a 2 ) or project 1 is replaced by project 2, because the first inequality in (7) is flipped. As a result, winners and losers are non-bossy.
On a first glance, Inequalities (7) seem to suggest that it is always optimal to greenlight the project with the higher virtual surplus when |γ(c 1 , c 2 )| = 1.
2
However, always greenlighting the better project may not be feasible when the set A is determined optimally. Suppose that in optimum, ψ 1 (a 1 ) > ψ 2 (a 2 ). Then,
4
an allocation γ(a 1 + ε, a 1 ) = 1 for some ε > 0 would not be strategyproof: Given c 2 = a 2 , project 1 of cost type a 1 would want to misreport costs to gain a transfer 6 of at least a 1 + ε. Such a combination of (a 1 , a 2 ) turns out to be a generic feature of the optimal mechanism.
8
Let us consider the nontrivial two-project case: The rewritten maximization problem of the designer (3) is given by
By virtue of the optimal properties, the designer must greenlight project i once its cost is below the constant a i . If both projects report greater costs, the designer is free to choose one of them. A glance at the objective function (8) reveals that in such a case it is desirable to greenlight the project with greater positive virtual surplus. This insight allows us to rewrite the objective function (8) as a function of constant z,
i.e., the problem collapses to finding a single constant.
In the symmetric case, the ranking of virtual surpluses coincides with the reversed 10 order of costs. Hence, it can easily be seen that in the symmetric case either both projects are implemented or the one with lower costs. This observation for the 12 symmetric case extends to more than two projects, n > 2, see Subsection 3.3. A natural extension of this mechanism to the asymmetric case would involve 14 adjusting the cutoffs so that they equalize virtual surplus. This modification ensures that, if a project has to be redlighted, the least attractive project in 16 terms of virtual surplus is rejected. We call this allocation rule the candidate allocation.
2
The nongeneric condition for optimality of the candidate allocation is stated in (10). To implement the candidate allocation, the constant cutoffs at which both projects are greenlighted must be a pair (a 1 , a 2 ) = (z, B − z) such that ψ 1 (z) = ψ 2 (B − z). Then, however, optimality is only obtained if
.
6
The intuition behind this statement is straightforward. Selecting z in order to satisfy ψ 1 (z) = ψ 2 (B − z) allows the designer to always greenlight the project 8 with the higher virtual surplus, whenever it is not feasible to greenlight both projects. However, if
the cutoffs z and B − z do not maximize 10 the probability to greenlight both projects. Consequently, the designer can adjust the cutoffs {z, B − z} to trade off a higher probability of implementing the most 12 favorable allocation (γ(c 1 , c 2 ) = {1, 2}) against a positive probability of having to implement the less preferred of two possible singleton allocations (γ(c) = {j},
14
when project j has lower virtual surplus).
Therefore two aspects of the designer's payoff maximization -getting projects 16 with high virtual surplus and getting as many projects as possible -are only aligned if condition (10) is met. In the symmetric case, the condition holds by 18 construction. However, in an asymmetric environment it is generically violated.
Proposition 1. In the nontrivial asymmetric two-project case, i.e., n = 2 and z * * 1 + z * * 2 > B, in which values or cost distributions differ across projects, it is generically not optimal to always greenlight the project with the higher virtual surplus. That is, under the optimal allocation rule γ, there may exist cost vectors such that i ∈ γ(c i , c j ), and j ∈ γ(c i , c j )
Proof. Given the max operators in (9), the derivative takes a different form depending on whether ψ 1 (z) ≷ ψ 2 (B − z). However, as π is continuously differentiable, it suffices to look at one of the two forms,
20
Now, consider z corresponding to the candidate allocation with ψ 1 (z) = ψ 2 (B − z), which yields
a nongeneric case. Consequently, it is generically not optimal to always allocate to the project with the higher virtual surplus.
2
Proposition 1 is driven by a tradeoff between quantity and quality: Even though the designer prefers the project with higher virtual surplus conditional on imple-4 menting only a single project, she sometimes greenlights the project with lower virtual surplus out of two rival projects, as quantity is endogenous here. By 6 endogenous quantity, we mean that the designer is only restricted by the feasibility constraints and is otherwise free to choose how many projects she want to is depicted in Panel 2a. In contrast, the maximal feasible probability to greenlight both projects is at equal cutoffs, a 1 = a 2 = 0.5. The corresponding area 6 is the dotted square in the lower-left corner of Panel 2b. However, at these cutoffs it is not incentive compatible to guarantee the green light for the project 8 with higher virtual surplus in every case. More specifically, it is not incentive compatible to allocate along the dotted 12 diagonal line, if at least one project 10 exceeds a i . Hence, strategyproofness introduces a tradeoff between maximizing the probability of greenlighting both projects and allocating to the preferred one 12 if only one project is feasible. Consequently, the optimal (a * 1 , a * 2 ) do not lie at (0.625, 0.375) but rather at (0.53, 0.47). Importantly, this optimal discrimination 14 against the stronger project is pursued on top of the usual discrimination against stochastically stronger projects reflected in the virtual costs.
16
Given the optimal allocation in Example 1, there are some realizations of the cost vector for which the designer greenlights the project with lower virtual surplus.
18
These realizations are represented by the shaded area in Panel 3a. Here, the constraints and the choice of (a 1 , a 2 ) force the designer to greenlight project 2, 20 even though project 1 has the higher virtual surplus.
The cost vectors for which the designer implements both projects are represented 22 by the rectangular area in the lower-left corner of Panel 3a. Any point (a 1 , a 2 ) on the dashed line representing the budget constraint satisfies a 1 + a 2 = B.
24
12 Not to be confused with the dashed diagonal representing the budget constraint.
22
Moving this corner point southeast from (0.5, 0.5) along the dashed budget line has two effects: shrinking the shaded area and shrinking the area of the lower-left 2 rectangle. While it is desirable to shrink the shaded area, in which the designer must allocate to project 2 despite its lower virtual surplus, it is undesirable to 4 shrink the size of the rectangle, which in this example represents the probability that both projects are conducted. Given that we have an interior solution in this 6 example, at (a 1 , a 2 ) these two effects balance each other out. Graphically, the fact that there is no slack in the budget constraint if both 8 projects are greenlighted implies that the area representing points at which both projects are executed touches the dashed line at least once. In fact, it can touch 10 the budget line exactly once, as it is not possible to greenlight both projects when c 1 > a 1 or c 2 > a 2 without violating (BC) sometimes. This result means 12 that the area where both projects are greenlighted is the rectangle with corners (0, 0) and (a 1 , a 2 ). Then, if c 1 < a 1 but c 2 > a 2 , the nature of cutoffs prevents the Property 3 non-bossy, and Property 4 has substitutes.
8
Being able to restrict attention to mechanisms with these properties is highly useful, as these mechanisms are a much more tangible class than the substantially larger set of all permissible cutoff mechanisms. In addition, all mechanisms with these properties can be implemented with a DA auction as proposed by Milgrom 12 and Segal (2015) . To this end, we first restate their definition adapted to our setting.
14 Definition 5 (DA auction). A deferred acceptance (DA) auction is an iterative algorithm defined by a collection of scoring functions
that are weakly increasing in c i for all i ∈ A and for all A ⊂ I. Let A t ⊂ I denote the set of active bidders in iteration t and initially A 1 = I. The algorithm stops in some period T when all active projects have a score of zero, s
= 0 for all i ∈ A T . Then the set of greenlighted project is A T . Otherwise, at each iteration t, the project with the highest score is removed. The payment p t i of project i at iteration t is either given by the highest possible cost that i could have had without being removed from the set of active bidders or by the last iteration's payment, depending on which payment is smaller,
The algorithm is initialized with p 0 i = min{c i , z * * i , B}.
13
The main appeal of DA auctions lies in their incentive guarantees. They are not 2 only strategyproof, they are obviously strategyproof, as defined by Li (2015) . Moreover, DA auctions are weakly group-strategyproof. That is, no coalition of 4 projects can manipulate their reports such that it strictly increases the utility of all projects in the coalition: At least one member of the coalition receives a 6 weakly worse payoff whenever other coalition members benefit. Because collusion in auctions is generally illegal, compensating the worse off coalition member is 8 not contractible. In addition, the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome in a DA auction can be interpreted as robust in the following sense: Consider the 10 full-information game in which all cost reports are observed, projects can report any cost, the allocation is determined according to the DA auction's allocation 12 rule, but projects receive their own report as payments. The dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome of the DA auction is the only outcome that survives iterated 14 deletion of dominated strategies in this game.
Proposition 2. (Milgrom and Segal (2015) ) Any monotonic allocation rule with 16 substitutes and non-bossy winners has a DA auction representation and can be implemented with a descending-clock auction. and-only-if statement. However, the necessity of the substitutes condition hinges on the fact that they want the statement to hold for any subset of the type 22 space. We discuss this necessity further in Subsection 3.4. By Proposition 2, 13 Compared to Milgrom and Segal (2015) , we slightly tweak the updating function of payments without changing the deferred acceptance nature of the algorithm and any of its properties.
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the optimal allocation can be implemented with a descending-clock auction. In the following, we show how to accommodate the tradeoff between quantity and 2 quality elaborated on in Proposition 1 in a modified clock auction.
Corollary 1. Generically, in an optimal implementation with descending price 4 clocks, the clocks not only run at individual speeds, occasionally some clocks also have to halt.
6
Since the optimal allocation rule in the symmetric case is anonymous, it can be implemented with a single clock that suggests prices for all active projects. 8 However, in asymmetric cases, each project must have an individual price clock, because heterogeneous virtual surplus functions require individual speeds. In-terestingly, an implication of the quantity-quality tradeoff is that sometimes one clock has to halt. For Example 1, the clock prices, denoted by τ i , are depicted in decreases while τ 1 is held constant, which happens until both clock prices lead to the same virtual surplus, i.e., ψ 2 (τ 2 ) = ψ 1 (c 2 ). Second, both τ 1 and τ 2 decrease si- 16 multaneously, but asynchronously keeping virtual surplus equal, ψ 1 (τ 1 ) = ψ 2 (τ 2 ), until τ 2 = z 2 (c 1 ). Third, only τ 1 decreases until τ 1 = z 1 (c 2 ). If at this point both 18 projects still remain in the auction, the auction stops and both are greenlighted. Otherwise, the inferior project 2 is greenlighted. Given the complexity of our problem, we do not find a simple and general (n > 2) 12 full characterization of the optimal mechanism in the asymmetric case that we further elaborate on in Subsection 3.4. In our examples with two projects, the 14 problem boils down to finding one point, (a 1 , a 2 ), with respect to one crucial tradeoff. Naturally, the number of relevant tradeoffs increases with the number 16 of projects. Therefore unfortunately, optimization with a larger set of projects quickly loses tractability. 3.3 n > 2. The symmetric case
In this section, we focus on symmetric projects, i.e., environments with v i = v 20 and F i = F for every project i ∈ I. An implication of this assumption is that the order of costs coincides with the order of virtual surpluses and that z * * i = z * * for 22 all i ∈ I. Hence, there is no such tradeoff as in asymmetric cases: The designer can maximize the probability to implement the best allocation (greenlight as 24 many projects as the budget allows) without being forced to greenlight an inferior project by the incentive constraint.
26
Proposition 3. Arrange the projects in ascending order of their reported costs,
, z * * , c k+1 . In 28 the symmetric case, given any cost vector, the optimal number of implemented projects k * is given by k * := max{k|c k ≤ z k } and all implemented projects
Proof. First of all, define k = max{k : kc ≤ B} as the maximal possible number of procured projects. Even under full information it is never budget-feasible to implement more than k projects. Consequently, implementing the cheapest k projects is the designer's most favorable allocation. Let c −i,k be the k-th highest cost of i's competitors. By setting
for all i ∈ I the designer guarantees the first-best allocation for all vectors such that c k ≤ B k for any k > k: The cheapest k projects are greenlighted when they 2 have nonnegative virtual surplus, otherwise all projects with nonnegative virtual surplus are greenlighted.
4
By setting
for all i ∈ I the designer guarantees the first-best allocation for all vectors such that c k ≤ B k < c k+1 . As all cost distributions are identical, the probability to 6 implement this payoff-maximizing set is maximized by setting these symmetric cutoffs.
8
The designer cannot additionally implement the first-best allocation for other cost vectors without violating at least one of the constraints. By setting cut-offs asymmetrically, the designer can greenlight k projects for other cost vectors. However, such an alternative mechanism features a lower probability to imple-12 ment k projects.
Since for all other cost vectors the payoff-maximizing set is not implementable,
14
the designer considers the next-best set, implementing the (k − 1) cheapest projects. Analogously to the steps before, she sets
to maximize the probability to implement the next-best set (greenlighting the cheapest k −1 projects) taken as given the cutoffs set in Equations (11) and (12).
18
We arrive at the proposed mechanism by continuing in this fashion.
To sum up, in the symmetric case, the optimal allocation rule takes a simple 20 form: The cheapest projects are greenlighted and the mechanism greenlights as many projects as the budget allows, while each procured project receives the 22 same compensation. Any project that is redlighted prefers this allocation status over having to conduct the project with the associated compensation. It can 24 be easily verified that this allocation rule indeed inherits all the properties we derived in the asymmetric two-project case. Thus, the optimal allocation is There are two rationales for greenlighted projects to get the same transfer. First, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, this cutoff rule maximizes the probability 2 of getting as many projects as possible. Strategyproofness prevents the budget from being shifted away from projects with low cost reports to projects with high 4 costs as in the full-information allocation. Therefore offering equal cutoffs is the best the designer can do. Second, as seen in (3), the rewritten maximization 6 problem of the designer, the expected utility of the designer is given by the sum of virtual surpluses of greenlighted projects. Therefore she wants to greenlight 8 those projects with the highest virtual surpluses. That goal is consistent with offering equal cutoffs to greenlighted projects and excluding those with higher 10 cost. In the optimal allocation, greenlighted projects have higher virtual surplus than those which are not greenlighted. The compatibility of the two goals -get fit from an ex-ante perspective. The second major difference between the relaxed optimal allocation and the optimal allocation can be seen for those realizations of 6 costs such that allocating to both projects would be feasible only in the relaxed problem. This difference is a result of the designer's inability to shift budget 8 from low-cost to relatively higher-cost projects with a strategyproof mechanism.
Corollary 2. In the symmetric case, the optimal direct mechanism can be im-plemented by a descending-clock auction. The clock price, denoted by τ , starts at z * * and descends continuously and synchronously down to
. Projects can 12 drop out at any price but cannot re-enter. The auction stops once the clock price can be paid out to all projects remaining in the auction.
14
In any iteration, a scoring function of the corresponding DA auction is
We consider the descending-clock auction of Corollary 2 to be a natural indirect mechanism that implements the outcome of the optimal allocation. Project i's 16 equilibrium strategy, which implements this outcome, has it staying active as long as the price is weakly larger than its private cost, τ ≥ c i . It is easily
18
verifiable that this is a weakly dominant strategy for project i.
3.4 n > 2. The asymmetric case
20
In general, not all our insights from the two-project case carry over as nicely as in the symmetric case. In this section, we first establish that the sufficient properties 
and R = I \ G, the optimal cutoff 14 The spirit of this example is due to Daniel García.
function z g for all g ∈ G is (almost everywhere) independent of the costs of all greenlighted projects c G . That is,
The proof is stated in the appendix. It generalizes the intuition of the two-project proof by defining some a i similar to (5), which is set-individual and contingent on 2 cost reports of redlighted projects. The proof relies on the substitutes condition in Inequality (14) . Unlike the two-project case, with more projects there not 4 necessarily exists a cost combinationċ such that z g (ċ −g ) = a G g for all projects g in some allocation set G. As an immediate consequence of Lemma 5, the following 6 corollary establishes that any optimal cutoff mechanism with substitutes has non-bossy winners. That is, for optimal allocation rules with substitutes a clock-8 auction implementation exists.
Corollary 3. Any optimal mechanism with substitutes also has non-bossy win-10 ners: If γ has substitutes, for all vectors c G :
Hence, for all i ∈ I, for all c −i ∈ C −i , and for all c i , c i ∈ C i with c i < c i , in any optimal mechanism,
However, there are settings such that project substitutability is not optimal.
12
Importantly, complementarities can ensue endogenously despite our assumption that projects' values and costs are independent of the allocation. If the lowest 14 possible cost levels c i are such that greenlighting some project combinations is never feasible, projects can endogenously become complements. We call such 16 parameter combinations disjoint and also refer to two projects as disjoint if for no cost vector both projects can feasibly be greenlighted together. The first reason 18 for complementarity is that two projects are only desirable when implemented together as seen in the following example: The designer prefers implementing 20 1 and 2 together over implementing 3 alone, but once either 1 or 2 becomes too expensive the other project is dropped as well in favor of implementing only 22 project 3.
Example 2. Suppose n = 3 and z * * i = c i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let the values be 24 such that
for all (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) ∈ C and let the cost supports be such that
Then, the corresponding optimal mechanism has the following form
This example can be seen as an extension of the asymmetric two-project case to 2 a third project that can never be implemented together with any of the other two. To find the optimal allocation, the designer hast to find a constant z such 4 that {1, 2} is implemented when (c 1 , c 2 ) ≤ (z, B − z) as in the two-project case. However, she does not have to consider the quantity-quality tradeoff. The reason 6 is that project 3 is optimally greenlighted once one of the other projects' costs exceeds its cutoff. Here, bidder substitutability fails because, as c 1 increases (ε > 0) from z − ε to z + ε, project 2 with costs c 2 ≤ B − z gets dropped from the allocation set. The designer cannot consider an alternative mechanism that reduces z 3 marginally to increase z 2 because the lower cost bounds prohibit that projects 2 and 3 are 12 ever conducted together and implementing {3} is preferred to implementing {2} alone. The cutoff mechanism in this example has non-bossy complements as 14 projects 1 or 2 can only influence the allocation by changing their own allocation status.
16
This example satisfies only two of the three sufficient conditions for an implementation by a DA auction or clock auction. Clearly, the substitutes condition 18 we imposed is not necessary. In this disjoint example, it is easy to construct an implementation with price clocks: All clocks start at the upper bounds. Then (at 20 arbitrary speed) the prices of 1 and 2 descend to (z, B − z). If both projects are still active, the price for project 3 jumps to zero, and 1 and 2 are implemented 22 with their corresponding clock prices. If any project i ∈ {1, 2} drops out earlier, then the price for j = i, j ∈ {1, 2} drops to zero, while price 3 remains at c 3 : 3 24 is implemented with its maximal transfer.
Because project 1 and 2 are complements their price clocks have to be inter-
26
connected. This interconnection of price clocks is not a contradiction to the requirement that a DA scoring function of any project i only depends on c i and the costs of rejected projects, c I\A . The reason is that a single project i ∈ {1, 2} can infer from its own cost whether allocation {1, 2} is ruled out. Thus, either 2 one of the two projects is rejected in the first iteration (has the highest score) or, if both projects find the payoff-maximizing allocation set to be feasible, project 4 3 is rejected and the algorithm stops in the next iteration. If a project i ∈ {1, 2} is rejected in the first iteration, the score of the remaining project j ∈ {1, 2} 6 can depend on the cost of the rejected project i to be rejected next. Returning to a deferred acceptance logic, the scoring function first test whether the 8 most-preferred allocation is blocked by project 1 or 2.
The next example features another kind of complementarity. In this example, 10 project 3 can be a bossy loser. To construct this example, we intertwine a disjoint two-project symmetric environment with an additional small project. The small 12 project can additionally be implemented if the residual budget suffices, which by construction of the example is not always the case.
14 Example 3. Suppose n = 3 and z * * i = c i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let
for all (c, c, c 3 ) ∈ C and let F 1 = F 2 (implying c 1 = c 2 ) with cost supports such
The optimal mechanism takes the following form
Here, the designer prefers to implement the cheaper of the symmetric projects 18 and adds small project 3 when feasible. The redlighted symmetric project can be a bossy loser since it determines the transfer to the other symmetric project.
20
Hence, it determines the residual budget for project 3 and this residual budget is the cutoff level of project 3. As a result, an increase in the redlighted symmetric In the above examples, the allocation rules are monotonic and have non-bossy 28 winners. However, they only satisfy a weaker form of project substitutability: All projects are substitutes for disjoint projects, i.e., the cutoff of a project is allowing for a DA-auction implementation in our setting.
Discussion
16
With our model as a starting point, there are several interesting modifications. In this section, we address the most natural alternative models or extensions. 
26
Interdependent types -We can interpret the symmetric case as a setting in which identical projects are provided at individual costs. Hence, one may 28 wonder about a setting in which projects only draw an imperfect signal about the cost, which finally depends on other projects' signals as well. In a clock 30 auction in such an environment, active projects update their belief about the cost whenever a project drops out. Moreover, the designer learns this information as 32 well. Therefore the design of the optimal mechanism crucially depends on the information structure.
Residual money -Whether it is reasonable to assume that the designer values residual money depends on the application. In Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a), 2 money does not enter the objective function, only the constraints. To clarify the relation to their paper, we introduce a linear weighting λ ∈ [0, 1] of residual 4 money, and provide comparative statics on parameter λ. The objective function can be rewritten as in (3),
This objective function highlights one difference to the original setting. Instead of ζ * * -exclusive the optimal mechanism is ζ * * λ -exclusive: Define ψ i,λ (c)
) as the λ-adjusted virtual surplus and define the vector ζ * * λ with i-the element z * * i,λ = min{c i , ψ −1 i,λ (0)}.
10
Our insights in this paper qualitatively extend to any linear weighting λ. In fact, the optimal allocation in the symmetric case remains unchanged if ζ * * λ =
12
(c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., when the original optimal mechanism did not exclude any cost types. For any combination of cost supports and values, 14 there exists a sufficiently small λ ′ > 0 such that the designer's ranking over projects is lexicographic. In other words, λ ′ must be sufficiently small such that 16 no λ ′ -weighted difference in cost can offset any difference in values.
Introducing a weight λ affects the quantity-quality tradeoff. To illustrate how 18 the optimal allocation varies when λ is perturbed, we consider Example 1 again, see Figure 6 . A lower λ means that the designer prefers the high-value project 1 20 for higher cost reports relative to the low-value project 2 for a given cost report. This difference is illustrated by a right-shift in the diagonal that represents the 22 loci such that both projects have equal (λ-adjusted) virtual surplus.
Reducing the weight of residual money increases the measure of cost reports 24 for which the optimal mechanism implements project 2 despite project 1 having the larger λ-adjusted virtual surplus. As illustrated in Figure 6 , reducing λ 26 means that, in the optimal mechanism, the cutoffs at which both projects are greenlighted move southeast along the budget line, thus reducing the probability 28 to greenlight both projects. The reason is that for lower λ a higher weight is placed on the high-value project 1. 
Conclusion
Despite their importance, knapsack problems with private information have been 2 somewhat overlooked by the economics literature. We examine a setting in which a budget-constrained procurer faces privately-informed sellers under ex-post con-4 straints. Amongst many possible economic problems, this setting particularly applies to development funds, which are typically endowed with a fixed budget 6 and want to distribute this money to a set of heterogeneous projects. Such problems often entail relationships in which sellers can renege on the terms of the 8 agreement ex-post. To avoid nondelivery, shelving the project or costly renegotiation, it is appropriate to impose ex-post constraints on the agents' participation.
For a relevant subset such settings, we have shown that DA auctions constitutes the class of optimal deterministic strategyproof mechanisms.
12
An optimal mechanism is described by a set of cutoff functions: All projects that report costs below their cutoff are implemented and receive a transfer equal 14 to their cutoff. In any two-project case, these cutoff functions are weakly increasing in the other project's costs, which means that the optimal allocation 16 rule has substitutes: Given a project is implemented for some cost vector, it is also implemented when, all else being equal, the cost of the rival project is 18 36 increased. For any optimal allocation rule that has substitutes, we show that it also has non-bossy winners: A project that is implemented cannot affect the 2 allocation without changing its own allocation status. In particular, if two different realizations of the cost vector lead to the same allocation, then the cutoffs 4 of conducted projects only vary in the costs of projects not conducted. Finally, the optimal allocation rule excludes all projects with negative "virtual surplus"
6 from the allocation.
These properties allow for a characterization as a deferred acceptance (DA) auc- tion, introduced by Milgrom and Segal (2015) . The DA auction representation provides a simple implementation via descending-clock auctions, which are easy 10 to understand and usable in practice. In addition, DA auctions have attractive properties regarding incentive compatibility which make the prediction of 12 equilibrium play more robust. Furthermore, we investigate exemplary settings in which project substitutability fails, but a DA-auction implementation exists 14 nevertheless. Thereby, we shed light on the necessity of substitute-like conditions.
16
We fully describe the optimal allocation and the corresponding descending-clock auction in an environment in which projects are ex-ante symmetric. The optimal 18 mechanism is monotone in the sense that the cheapest projects are greenlighted and all projects conducted receive the same transfer. This transfer either corre-
20
sponds to the lowest cost among redlighted projects or the budget is distributed equally. The equivalent clock auction features a single price clock that continu-
22
ously descends until all active projects can be financed.
For asymmetric environments, in which values and/or cost distributions differ,
24
we demonstrate a novel tradeoff between quantity and quality of the implemented projects. The designer prefers projects with high virtual surplus over projects 26 with low virtual surplus and she prefers more projects over fewer projects. In models in which the designer wants to procure a fixed number of projects, she 28 would always choose the projects with the highest virtual surpluses. If quantity is endogenously determined by a budget-constrained mechanism designer, it is ex-
30
ante not always desirable to select the best projects. When the best projects are always conducted, incentive compatibility would force the designer to reduce the 32 expected number of greenlighted projects. This insight entails a consequence for the corresponding descending-clock auction: Clocks not only run asynchronously,
34
but also periodically have to stop for certain projects.
We identify an interesting question for future research, namely, what is the 36 weakest substitute condition such that a DA implementation exists. Having an understanding of such a condition paves the way to study extensions such as
